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Dear Ms. Bartholomew:
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule
24 (i), the Utah State Tax Commission submits the enclosed
decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Ward v. South
Carolina, No. 25758 (South Carolina, December 8, 2003) as a
supplemental authority to- its brief filed November 24, 2003.
The South Carolina decision addresses the question on the
merits found on pages 12-30 of the Utah State Tax Commission's
November 24, 2003, brief and analyzes the cases discussed in that
brief.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Doris Stieglitz Ward,
individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Appellants,

v.
State of South Carolina,

Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 25758
Heard September 25, 2003 - Filed December 8, 2003

AFFIRMED

A. Camden Lewis, of Lewis, Babcock & Hawkins, LLP; John M.S.
Hoefer and Paige Jones Gossett, of Willoughby & Hoefer, PA, all of
Columbia, for appellants.
Vance J. Bettis and Shahin Vafai, of Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis,
L.L.P., of Columbia, for respondent.

34

JUSTICE BURNETT: Appellant Doris Stieglitz Ward brings
this direct appeal on behalf of a class of federal retirees challenging the
circuit court's decision upholding the constitutionality of Act 189, 1989 Acts
623 (Act 189). Federal retirees claim that South Carolina discriminates in
taxation between state and federal retirees in violation of the federal
constitutional and statutory intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
ISSUE
Did the circuit court err in holding that Act 189 does not violate the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine now codified in 4 U.S.C. § 111
(1997)1 and is therefore constitutional?
DISCUSSION
Statutes are to be construed in favor of constitutionality, and this
Court will presume a legislative act is constitutional, unless its repugnance to
the Constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. Main v. Thomason,
342 S.C. 79, 86, 535 S.E.2d 918, 921 (2000).
The South Carolina General Assembly enacted Act 189 to
comply with the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Michigan
Dept't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989).
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the Michigan Income Tax Act violated
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired state and
local government employees over retired federal employees. The Michigan
statute exempted retirement benefits paid by state and local governments
from state income taxes without exempting retirement benefits paid by the
federal government from state income taxes. The Supreme Court stated, "It
That Section provides in relevant part, "The United States
consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal service as an
officer or employee of the United States.. .by a duly constituted taxing
authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the
officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation."
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is undisputed that Michigan's tax system discriminates in favor of retired
state employees and against retired federal employees." Id. at 814, 109 S.Ct.
at 1507, 103L.Ed.2dat904.
To resolve the unconstitutional taxation provision, the Supreme
Court declared that a mandate of "equal treatment" would remedy the
constitutional infirmity in the Michigan statute. The Supreme Court stated:
[A]ppellant's claim could be resolved either by extending the tax
exemption to retired federal employees (or to all retired employees), or
by eliminating the exemption for retired state and local government
employees. *** [T]he Michigan courts are in the best position to
determine how to comply with the mandate of equal treatment.
Id at 818, 109 S.Ct. at 1509, 103 L.Ed.2d at 907.
Prior to Davis, South Carolina exempted all state retirement
benefits from income taxation, but only exempted the first $3,000 of federal
retirement benefits. Act 189, § 39 repealed the tax exemption for state
retirement benefits, thereby rendering all federal and state retirement benefits
in excess of $3,000 taxable. In addition to repealing the tax exemption, the
General Assembly simultaneously increased retirement benefits for state and
local retirees by 7%. Act 189, § 60. This increase in benefits is provided to
all state retirees, regardless of their tax liability. The State does not dispute
that the General Assembly increased retirement benefits to compensate state
retirees, in part, for their increased income tax obligations resulting from the
enactment of Act 189.
Federal retirees contend that Act 189 is unconstitutional because
the State continues to discriminate against federal retirees by increasing the
pension benefits paid to state and local retirees in an effort to offset the
increased tax liability resulting from the exemption. In other words, federal
retirees argue that the State has indirectly recast the pre-Davis discriminatory
exemption through the 7% increase in benefits for state retirees. We disagree.
For the following reasons, we conclude Act 189 is not, in effect, a "tax
rebate" that implicates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.
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First, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity does not
deprive a state of its sovereignty to establish the level of its employees'
compensation as long as the State does not discriminate in taxation based on
the source of the income. The Tenth Amendment provides, "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." U.S. Const,
amend X. To determine if a statute violates the Tenth Amendment, we must
first determine whether the regulation it embodies is within those enumerated
in the Constitution. Second, we must determine whether the regulation
employed impermissibly infringes upon state sovereignty. United States v.
Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997) referring to New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2418, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 137
(1992). The power to compensate state retirees is clearly not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution. As long as federal and state retirees are
taxed equally, any restriction on this authority would violate the Tenth
Amendment.
Second, in enacting Act 189, the General Assembly specifically
followed the dictate of Davis by eliminating the tax exemption for both state
and federal employees. In doing so, the General Assembly was guided by the
remedies suggested by the Supreme Court. In direct response to Davis, the
General Assembly amended South Carolina's tax statute to remove the tax
exemption for state retirees. Act 189 conformed South Carolina to the
requirements of the Davis decision.
Federal retirees argue the "indisputable linkage" between the
increase in compensation and the tax exemption renders Act 189
unconstitutional under Davis. They argue that the Court must consider
substance over form in evaluating the constitutionality of Act 189. See West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,201, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 2215, 129
L.Ed.2d 157, 171 (1994)(holding in a dormant Commerce Clause case, that it
is not the form by which a state discriminates, but whether the means
employed will result in discrimination). We do not believe Davis holds, or
otherwise implies, that states may only raise retirement benefits for its state's
retirees if the pension increase in no way serves to offset a prior tax
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exemption. Even if the elimination of the tax exemption for state retirees and
the simultaneous increase in benefits are read together, the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity is not violated. South Carolina has
specifically followed the remedy prescribed by Davis. Therefore, federal
retirees' argument is unavailing.
Third, neither Davis nor 4 U.S.C. § 111 prohibit the State from
contracting with its retirees on the level of compensation paid to its retirees.
The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine serves to protect each
sovereign's governmental operations from undue interference from the other.
Davis, 489 U.S. at 814, 109 S.Ct. at 1507, 103 L.Ed.2d at 904. Davis does
not hold, nor does it even suggest, that a state is prohibited from adjusting the
compensation of its employees, even if the state's purpose is to compensate
its employees for the loss of the income tax exemption. A state is entitled to
raise the level of taxable compensation of its employees if it so chooses.
Davis requires that the state tax federal and state retirees equally and does not
concern itself with the manner in which a state chooses to compensate its
retirees.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a state's response
to the Court's decision could be to increase compensation to state retirees to
offset what those retirees lost in benefits as a result of being taxed. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated:
Even if it were appropriate to determine the discriminatory nature of a
tax system by comparing the treatment of federal employees with the
treatment of another discrete group of persons, it is peculiarly
inappropriate to focus solely on the treatment of state governmental
employees. The state may always compensate in pay or salary for
what it assesses in taxes. Thus a special tax imposed only on federal
and state employees nonetheless may reflect the type of disparate
treatment that the intergovernmental tax immunity forbids because of
the ability of the State to adjust any special tax burden on them.. .It
trivializes the Supremacy Clause to interpret it as prohibiting the States
from providing through this limited tax exemption what the state has
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an unquestionable right to provide through increased retirement
benefits.
489 U.S. at 824, 109 S.Ct. at 1512, 103 L.Ed.2d at 910-911. (emphasis
added).
Although the majority disagreed with the first sentence in the
above passage, they took no issue with a state's ability to lawfully increase
the benefits paid to state retirees to offset the effect of the Court's holding.
South Carolina's increase is the type of response to Davis specifically
contemplated by the Supreme Court. The doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity does not apply because there is no discrimination in taxation on
account of the source of compensation.
Fourth, we find no direct correlation between state retirees' state
tax obligations and the amount of increased retirement benefits. All eligible
state retirees receive the 7% increase in retirement benefits. Act 189 resulted
in an increase in compensation for state retirees, and was not a dollar for
dollar offset. Moreover, the increased benefits are subject to both state and
federal taxation. In Davis, the majority stated, "[t]axes enacted to reduce the
State's employment costs at the expense of the federal treasury are the type of
discriminatory legislation that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity is intended to bar." Davis, 489 U.S. at 815, 109 S.Ct. at 905, 103
L.Ed.2d at 1508. The General Assembly's increase in retirement actually
increased the employment costs for South Carolina, while simultaneously
bolstering the federal treasury.
Federal retirees rely on Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement
Div., 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993) and Vogl v. Dep't of Revenue, 960 P.2d
373 (Or. 1998). In Sheehy, federal retirees challenged Montana's 1991
statute enacted in response to Davis. Before Davis, Montana, like South
Carolina, taxed federal retirement benefits but exempted state retirement
benefits. The Montana statute restructured the income tax on pension
benefits by equalizing the taxation of all pension benefits. In the same act,
the Montana legislature granted to state retirees who were Montana residents,
and who were now to be taxed in response to Davis, an annual retirement
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adjustment payment. Sheehy, 864 P.2d at 764. The Montana Supreme Court
held that the Montana statute violated the intergovernmental tax immunity
provision of 4 U.S.C. §111. The court stated,
It is clear that the adjustment is not an actual and legitimate pension or
retirement benefit. If it were a pension benefit, the State would have
provided it to all of its retirees in recognition of their years of public
service rather than just those living in Montana. There was no need to
do so because the sole purpose of the adjustment was to partially
recompense state retirees living in Montana for the tax they must pay
under the equalizing provisions of [the Montana law].
864 P.2d at 768.
Federal retirees argue that South Carolina's Act 189, like the
Montana statute, constitutes discriminatory taxation in violation of
intergovernmental tax immunity principles. We disagree. In reaching their
decision, the Montana Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact the
adjustment was provided only to state retirees who are Montana residents.
South Carolina's statute is distinguishable. Act 189 provides the increase to
all state retirees, regardless of their domicile.
The Oregon statute considered by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Vogl is also distinguishable from Act 189. The 1995 Oregon statute
explicitly stated that its purpose was to compensate for damages.
Furthermore, the benefit increases under the 1995 statute were
mathematically correlated to replace the lost state retirement income. South
Carolina's General Assembly did not tie the pension benefit increase, dollar
for dollar, to the lost tax exemption, nor did it declare that Act 189 was
designed to compensate state retirees for damages. South Carolina's Act 189
is analogous to the 1991 statute considered by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Ragsdale v. Dep't of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Or. 1995). In 1991, the
Oregon legislature repealed the tax exemption for state retirees and
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simultaneously increased the benefits for state retirees. Like Act 189,
Oregon's 1991 act provided no direct correlation between the increase in
benefits for state retirees and their tax obligations. Id. at 1350.
Federal retirees have failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that Act 189 is clearly repugnant to the Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
WALLER, A.C.J., and Acting Justices H. Samuel Stilwell, William
L. Howard and J. Mark Hayes, concur.
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A Virginia statute, recently considered by a Virginia circuit
court, is also similar to Act 189. In Almeter v. Virginia Department of
Taxation, 2000 WL 1687589 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), petition denied,
(Va. 2001), cert, denied, 2001 WL 872690 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001), federal
retirees brought a class action seeking a refund of state income taxes that they
alleged were illegally collected from them following that state's 3% increase
in retirement benefits for its state's retirees. Like the present case, federal
retirees alleged that the 3% increase was designed to offset the new tax
liability incurred by state retirees and therefore violated the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The Virginia circuit court
dismissed the federal retirees' claims in holding that the increase in benefits
was a remedy specifically envisioned by the Supreme Court in Davis.
41

